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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 CUDAHY, Circuit Judge. 
 
In 1983, Louis Deglau wanted to get into the business of 
reclaiming coal from "gob piles." He presented his idea to 
Gregor F. Meyer, an attorney and a member of the board of 
Horizon Financial, F.A., (Horizon) a federally chartered 
savings and loan association based in Bucks County, 
Pennsylvania. Horizon expressed interest in becoming the 
venture capital backer of the plan. Deglau formed Kelt, Inc. 
to carry on the business, and issued one hundred shares of 
stock to himself as sole shareholder. In March 1985, Kelt 
obtained from Horizon a loan of $1.15 million tofinance 
early operations. Kelt was to repay Horizon with interest, 
and Horizon was to receive half of Kelt's profits. Deglau was 
to get an annual salary of $80,000. Kelt's stock and all of 
its assets were pledged as security for this loan. The Loan 
Agreement was negotiated by Deglau's lawyer, Maurice 
Nernberg, and Horizon's lawyer, board member Meyer. The 
terms of the loan agreement are disputed, and will be 
discussed below. 
 
By November 1985, Kelt needed additional operating 
capital. Horizon balked at a second loan to the corporation, 
but eventually agreed to provide an additional $50,000 line 
of credit if it was personally guaranteed by Deglau and his 
wife. Louis agreed, but contends he conditioned the 
arrangement on the bank's agreement to credit Kelt's 
repayments first to his personal obligations. Having struck 
a deal, Horizon officials gave Louis and Margaret Deglau 
several documents to sign, some in blank. The note itself 
was signed in blank. Louis contends he understood it 
would be completed to reflect a $50,000 loan, but it was 
eventually filled out to reflect a $200,000 loan. Deglau also 
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contends that "unbeknownst to [him]," the Guaranty 
accompanying the note included a "spreader clause," which 
purported to hold the Deglaus personally liable for all of 
Kelt's obligations to the bank. R.249a.1  The Guaranty also 
contained a warrant of attorney clause allowing the bank to 
confess judgment against the Deglaus for their personal 
loans and the loans to Kelt. See R.308a-310a. The 
promissory notes for the November 1985 loan, and for a 
July 1986 loan also included warrant of attorney clauses, 
each typed out on separate sheets of paper, then attached 
to the notes. See R.303a-04a; R.312a-14a. 
 
Over the next year, Louis drew up to the $200,000 
provided for in the second note, and borrowed an additional 
$100,000. The bank eventually told him that under the 
Guaranty, he was personally liable for the additional 
$100,000; he objected, and he tells us he was assured 
verbally that the Guaranty would apply only to the 
$200,000 drawn against the note. At no time, Deglau 
states, did bank officials say that the Guaranty made him 
personally liable for the initial $1.15 million advance to 
Kelt. By November 1986, Kelt had repaid Horizon $168,000. 
However, by February 1987, Kelt needed another infusion 
of cash. Horizon suggested increasing the personal line of 
credit by $160,000. Louis agreed. 
 
While struggling with the gob pile endeavor, Louis had 
hatched another business idea -- precious metal 
reclamation. He mentioned his idea to Horizon board 
member Meyer. Meyer proposed that Louis pursue the idea 
with Horizon's backing. He suggested that Louis sell Kelt 
and use the proceeds to reduce his outstanding obligations 
at Horizon. Louis contends that Meyer told him to conceal 
from his attorney the negotiations to sell Kelt, and to allow 
the Meyer & Flaherty firm to represent Louis and Kelt. 
Louis obliged. Some time thereafter Louis sold Kelt to a 
company known as G, K & G. 
 
Deglau apparently missed payments to Horizon on the 
outstanding loans over the next several years. At the same 
time, Horizon was experiencing financial turmoil, and was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Throughout the opinion, citations to the Appellant's Appendix will be 
indicated by R.[page]. 
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eventually taken over by the Resolution Trust Corporation 
(RTC) and later by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC).2 In 1990, the FDIC advised Deglau that 
he was in default on the 1985 Kelt note for about $1.3 
million; the 1986 personal note for about $320,000; the 
1987 note for about $262,000; and a 1988 note for about 
$32,000. Acting on this belief, and on the warrant of 
attorney provision in the guaranty, the FDIC confessed 
judgment against the Deglaus for $2,416,986.47 in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania. 
 
A familiarity with judgment by confession as undertaken 
in Pennsylvania is essential to the decision of this case. 
 
        Judgment by confession is a product of state law, 
       having no analog in the federal rules. In Pennsylvania, 
       the state's Rules of Civil Procedure prescribe the 
       procedures and filing prerequisites for obtaining 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. On June 8, 1989, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation (FSLIC) was appointed as conservator of Horizon. Effective 
August 9, 1989, the RTC succeeded the FSLIC as conservator until, as 
noted, Horizon was closed and the RTC became receiver. As receiver, the 
RTC succeeded to all of the rights, titles, powers and privileges of 
Horizon. See Central W. Rental Co. v. Horizon Leasing, 967 F.2d 832, 833 
n.1 (3d Cir. 1992). See also 12 U.S.C. S 1441a(b)(4)(A). Pursuant to that 
statute, the FDIC is the exclusive manager for the RTC. Therefore the 
FDIC was the appellee in this case. See Central W. Rental Co., 967 F.2d 
at 833 n.1. See also 12 U.S.C. S 1441a (b)(1)(C). Subsequent to the 
initiation of the suit, the FDIC assigned its interest in the judgment to 
DFS, Inc., and DFS subsequently assigned its interest to the Cadle 
Company. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25, which governs the 
substitution of parties during the pendency of litigation, makes clear 
that in the absence of a motion to substitute, the action may properly 
continue by or against the transferor. See F ED. R. CIV. P. 25(c). The 
Deglaus protest that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the 
case because the FDIC was not the "real party in interest." But Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 17 requires that an action involve only the real 
parties in interest, as determined by transfers prior to the initiation of 
suit. See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a). Because this transfer took placeafter the 
FDIC brought suit, the Deglaus' proper vehicle for challenging the FDIC's 
continuing involvement was a Rule 25 motion. Having failed to bring that 
motion, the Deglaus have waived this issue. Thus, we will refer 
throughout the opinion to the FDIC rather than to the Cadle Company. 
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       confessed judgments and, in effect, affirm the validity 
       of contractual waivers of prejudgment procedures in 
       Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania's rules of procedure also 
       prescribe how a confessed judgment may be 
 
       successfully attacked. By motion to open the judgment, 
       a defendant may assert defenses going to the merits of 
       the alleged default. If the defendant presents evidence 
       in support of a meritorious defense sufficient to create 
       a triable issue of fact, the judgment will be opened. 
       Execution on the judgment will then be stayed until 
       the court can resolve the disputed claims, but the 
       judgment remains in effect as a judicial lien. 
 
        A motion to strike, on the other hand, tests the 
       sufficiency of the record upon which the confessed 
       judgment was entered. The court takes all the 
       plaintiff 's allegations as true and will grant the motion 
       only to remedy a "fatal defect or irregularity appear[ing] 
       on the face of the record or judgment." 
 
       Antipas v. 2102, Inc., No. CIV.A. 98-1145, 1998 WL 
       306537, at *1-*2 (E.D. Pa. June 9, 1998). 
 
I) Disposition Below 
 After the FDIC confessed judgment, the Deglaus filed in 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania a motion to open or 
strike the judgment. The Deglaus did not file a 
supplemental brief at that time, but incorporated by 
reference an earlier, unsuccessful complaint they had filed 
in the Western District of Pennsylvania seeking an 
injunction to prevent the FDIC from confessing judgment. 
See R.42a-61a (Motion, FDIC v. Deglau, CIV.A. No. 90-3594 
(incorporating by reference Complaint, Deglau v. RTC, No. 
90-881 (W.D. Pa. 1990)). The district court issued on the 
FDIC a rule to show cause why the judgment should not be 
struck or opened. At that time, the court set a discovery 
deadline that was later extended. During the discovery 
period, the Deglaus made two discovery requests of the 
FDIC; it responded to neither and the Deglaus did not move 
to compel a response. In 1992, two years after the judge 
ruled it to show cause, the FDIC filed its response. At no 
time did the Deglaus attempt to depose any bank officials 
or other persons involved in the case. In 1994, after the 
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case had lain dormant for two additional years, and without 
any renewed prompting by either party, the district court 
without explanation issued an order denying the motion to 
open or strike. R.181a (Order of Aug. 22, 1994). 
 
In response, the Deglaus then filed a motion to vacate or 
reconsider, which the district court denied. The Deglaus 
appealed the 1994 order denying their motion to open or 
strike the judgment, and we vacated and remanded in an 
unpublished order. See FDIC v. Deglau, 107 F.3d 861 (3d 
Cir. 1997). On remand, in 1997, the district court explained 
its initial denial of the motion: 
 
       It was my feeling at the time that the long periods of 
       inactivity in this matter, and the failure of the 
       [Deglaus] to submit a brief with their original motion, 
       indicated that the Deglaus were not sincere in their 
       pursuit of their equitable claims. More recently, I have 
       reviewed the entire file in this matter and it is my 
       feeling that the ends of justice require that the order 
       entered by this Court [denying the motion] be vacated. 
 
       R.212a. (Mem. of Sept. 20, 1997). 
 
The judge then ordered the Deglaus to file a brief in 
support of their motion. 
 
In 1998, after the Deglaus filed the required brief, the 
court again denied the Deglaus' motion to open or strike. 
The trial court denied the motion to strike the judgment 
because "[t]he Deglaus have not identified any `fatal defects 
or irregularities' on the face of the record." R.503a (Mem. of 
Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Mem.] (citing Manor Bldg. Corp. 
v. Manor Complex Ass'n, 645 A.2d 843 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1994)). The court denied the motion to open the judgment 
because the Deglaus had "made no effort to present 
evidence of meritorious defenses [to the confessed 
judgment] to this Court before the date of the FDIC's 
response, and failed to do so for more than two-and-a-half 
years thereafter." R.503a (Mem. at 9) (emphasis added). 
Further, it noted that the Deglaus initially "fail[ed] to file a 
brief in support of their motion." Id. Finally, the district 
court stated that in their motion and supplemental brief, 
the Deglaus failed to raise meritorious defenses to the entry 
of judgment. See Mem. at 10. The court went on to explain 
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why three of the seven defenses the Deglaus invoked were 
unmeritorious. 
 
The Deglaus challenge this determination on several 
grounds. First, they argue that the judge was not 
 
authorized to decide the motion without a request by the 
parties for a decision or for a hearing. Second, they contend 
that the trial court erred by denying the motion on the 
basis that they did not request an argument date or 
advance the cause for decision. Third, they complain that 
the trial court erred by denying their motion to open or 
strike the judgment on the grounds that they failed to file 
an accompanying brief with the motion. Fourth, they 
contend that the judge erred in holding that their 
substantive arguments were insufficient to merit granting 
the motion to open or strike. 
 
II) Procedural Issues 
 
A) Background 
 
The parties disagree about the soundness of the judge's 
determination that he could decide the motion on his own 
initiative in part because they differ over whether federal or 
state procedure applies. This court has stated that"a 
motion to open or vacate a judgment entered in the federal 
court is procedurally governed by Rule 60 [of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure]." Girard Trust Bank v. Martin, 557 
F.2d 386, 389-90 (3d Cir. 1977); see also Resolution Trust 
Corp. v. Forest Grove, Inc., 33 F.3d 284, 288 (3d Cir. 1994). 
Despite this broad mandate, lower courts have occasionally 
had difficulty applying Rule 60(b) because "the federal rules 
have no procedure for opening a judgment entered by 
confession." FDIC v. Barness, 484 F. Supp. 1134, 1141 
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (Becker, J.). Some courts have tried to 
apply federal rules. See, e.g., AmQuip Corp. v. Pearson, 101 
F.R.D. 332, 336 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Resolution Trust Corp. v. 
Parrish, CIV.A. No. 92-2050, 1992 WL 328893 at *2-*3 
(E.D. Pa. 1992); Antipas, 1998 WL 306537 at *2 n.4. Other 
courts have applied state procedure. See, e.g., Allied Bldg. 
Prods. Corp. v. Delco Roofing Co. Inc., 951 F. Supp. 1183, 
1187 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (stating that challenges to 
confessed judgments are governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a), 
which refers federal courts to state rules). 
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The broad teaching of Girard has not been overruled. We 
find Allied unpersuasive. Allied held that a challenge to a 
confessed judgment was governed by Federal Rule 69(a), 
which deals with procedures to be used on execution of a 
judgment. 951 F. Supp. at 1187 n.1. But we have 
suggested that Rule 69(a) is designed merely to foreclose 
conflict of law questions on the procedure to be used in the 
enforcement of a final judgment. See United States v. Miller, 
229 F.2d 839, 841 (3d Cir. 1956). Moreover, W.W. 
Development has suggested that conceptually, a petition to 
open is essentially the defensive phase of a confession of 
judgment case. 73 F.3d at 1307. Following this logic, the 
petition questions the validity of the creditor's judgment 
and there is little basis for applying to it the procedural rule 
that enable creditors to execute judgments. 
 
Despite our feeling that Girard requires the application of 
federal procedure to this case, the trial court, the defendant 
and the FDIC until late in the day have assumed that 
Pennsylvania procedure applied.3 Ultimately, in its 1998 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The trial court explained in detail the method for entering a judgment 
by confession. See R.499a-500a (Mem. at 5-6). It quoted in full PA. R. 
CIV. P. 2959, which governs motions for relief from a confessed 
judgment. See R.500a (Mem. at 6 n.1). It explained in its opinion that it 
initially issued a Rule to Show Cause in accord with PA. R. CIV. P. 
2959(b). See R.501a (Mem. at 7). It also stated that when the FDIC filed 
its response to the Deglaus' motion, the Rule to Show Cause became ripe 
for decision under PA. R. CIV. P. 2959(e). See R.502a (Mem. at 8). 
Finally, 
 
it cited Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 206.7, governing "Procedure 
after Issuance of Rule to Show Cause." See  R.503a (Mem. at 9 n.5). In 
their opening brief, the Deglaus state that "the district court applied 
Pennsylvania state procedure to the process." Appellant's Br. at 14 n.5. 
In its brief, the FDIC suggests that Pennsylvania procedure applies, 
citing the "state law incorporation" provisions of Federal Rule 69(a) and 
Allied Building Products v. Delco Roofing Co., Inc., 951 F. Supp. 1183 
(E.D. Pa. 1996). Appellee's Br. at 15. It then discusses the particulars 
of 
 
Pennsylvania rules. Eventually, however, the FDIC invokes federal 
procedural rules, stating that Local Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1 
governing motion practice justified the court's decision to dispose of the 
motion without oral argument. Appellee's Br. at 21. The Deglaus counter 
that the federal rules do not apply, citing the dictate of Hanna v. 
Plumer, 
 
380 U.S. 460 (1965) that in diversity cases, state procedure governs. 
Reply Br. at 5. The court's jurisdiction in this case was founded on the 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement act of 1989 
(FIRREA), 12 U.S.C. S 1819(b); 1441a(l)(1), and this argument is 
therefore meritless. 
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memorandum denying the Deglaus' motion to open or 
strike, the district court invoked Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 74 in order to deny the motion based on the 
Deglaus' original failure to file a brief. We acknowledge the 
confusion on this issue, and we acknowledge that we are to 
review the district court's decision -- here, its use of an 
amalgam of state and federal law -- for abuse of discretion. 
See Girard, 557 F.2d at 288. In order to assess whether the 
district court's concoction of state-federal procedural rules 
was an abuse of discretion, we review those rules and their 
application to this case. 
 
B) Review of Rules 
 
1) Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
 
Rule 60(b) states that "on motion and upon such terms 
as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
[for six substantive reasons]. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time, and for [three of the six reasons] 
not more than one year after the judgment, order, or 
proceeding was entered or taken. . . . [T]he procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as 
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action." FED. 
R. CIV. P. 60(b). The Deglaus requested relief by motion, 
which would trigger Rule 60(b)'s directive that the 
procedure for obtaining relief shall be by motion as 
prescribed in these rules. 
 
This directive points us to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
7, which governs motion practice in the federal courts. The 
relevant portion of Rule 7 states: "An application to the 
court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made 
during a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing, shall 
state with particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set 
forth the relief or order sought." FED. R. CIV. P. 7(b)(1). The 
broad strokes of Rule 7 are fleshed out substantially by 
Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7, which governs motion 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Former Local Rule of Civil Procedure 20, which governed motion 
practice at the time the Deglaus filed their Rule 60 motion, is 
substantially the same as current Local Rule 7. We will refer throughout 
to Rule 7. 
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practice in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Local Rule 
7.1(f) states that "[a]ny interested party may request oral 
argument on a motion," but "[t]he court may dispose of a 
motion without oral argument." E.D. PA. FED. R. CIV. P. 
7.1(f). In sum, if the Federal Rules applied to this case, the 
trial court was permitted to decide the motion to open or 
strike at any time it wished, after the petition and answer 
were filed, without hearing from the parties. 
 
2) State Rules of Civil Procedure 
 
According to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2959, 
"Striking Off or Opening Judgment; Pleadings; Procedure," 
one may seek relief from a judgment by confession in a 
petition stating the grounds for relief. PA. R. CIV. P. 2959(a). 
"If the petition states prima facie grounds for relief the 
court shall issue a rule to show cause and may grant a stay 
of proceedings. After being served with a copy of the 
petition, the plaintiff shall file an answer on or before the 
return day of the rule. The return day of the rule shall be 
fixed by the court by local rule or special order." PA. R. CIV. 
P. 2959(b). "The court shall dispose of the rule on petition 
and answer, and on any testimony, depositions, admissions 
and other evidence. . . ." PA. R. C IV. P. 2959(e). This 
language suggests that the court has discretion to decide 
the motion on the parties' filings alone in the absence of 
any effort to present supplemental evidence. 
 
The suggestion in Rule 2959(e) that the court has 
discretion to decide the motion on the parties'filings alone 
is made explicit by Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 
206.7. Titled "Procedure after Issuance of Rule to Show 
Cause," Rule 206.7(c) states in full that "[i]f an answer is 
filed raising disputed issues of material fact, the petitioner 
may take depositions on those issues, or such other 
discovery as the court allows, within the time set forth in 
the order of the court. If the petitioner does not do so, the 
petition shall be decided on petition and answer and all 
averments of fact responsive to the petition and properly 
pleaded in the answer shall be deemed admitted for the 
purpose of this subdivision." PA. R. CIV. P. 206.7(c). In sum, 
under current Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, once 
a petition and answer have been filed, and the petitioner 
has let the court's discovery period elapse, the trial court is 
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permitted to decide the petition on the basis of the parties' 
filings alone, without notification to the parties that a 
decision is imminent and without offering the parties an 
opportunity to offer live testimony.5 
 
The Deglaus protest that aside from their right to take 
discovery, they had a right to present live testimony under 
the Pennsylvania rules, and they protest that such 
testimony was crucial to explaining why their defenses to 
the confessed judgments were meritorious. See  Appellants' 
Br. at 22.6 In support of their argument, the Deglaus cite 
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 209, which was in 
effect until January 1, 1996, when Rule 206.7 superseded 
it. Rule 209 states that the petitioner (the Deglaus) has 15 
days from the filing of respondent (FDIC's) answer to 
"proceed . . . to take depositions on disputed issues of fact 
. . . or [o]rder the cause for argument . . . ." PA. R. CIV. P. 
209 (rescinded effective Jan. 1, 1996). If the petitioner fails 
to do so, respondent (FDIC) can take a rule on the moving 
party to show cause why he should not proceed. See id. "If 
after hearing the rule shall be made absolute by the court, 
and the petitioner shall not proceed, as above provided, 
within fifteen days thereafter, the respondent may order the 
cause for argument on petition and answer, in which event 
all averments of fact responsive to the petition and properly 
pleaded in the answer shall be deemed admitted for the 
purposes of the rule." Id. In essence, Rule 209 dictates that 
if the petitioners take no action on the case, the trial court 
is not authorized to decide the motion on the parties' 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The trial judge afforded the Deglaus a generous period to conduct 
discovery as soon as he issued the rule to show cause. The Deglaus 
made two requests of the FDIC, both of which were unanswered. The 
Deglaus did not request a motion to compel responses or try to move 
discovery forward in any other way. In short, they let the discovery 
period lapse. 
 
6. Many of the Deglaus' defenses turn on their interpretation of the 
disputed documents, and their recollection of conversations with Horizon 
officials regarding the meaning of the documents. Apparently, they feel 
that the cold paper record was insufficient to demonstrate the alleged 
fraud perpetrated by Horizon. For reasons discussed below, federal law 
restricts them to the cold paper record for some of their defenses. See 12 
U.S.C. S 1823(e). 
 
                                11 
 
 
pleadings unless the respondent requests such a decision, 
the court notifies the petitioner that he will lose his right to 
request oral argument in 15 days and the petitioner takes 
no action within that window. At that point, the respondent 
may ask the court to decide the motion on the parties' 
filings. 
 
The Deglaus correctly observe a tension between Rule 
2959(e) and former Rule 209; the former seems to allow the 
judge flexibility to order the case for decision, while the 
latter seemed to deprive the judge of that power. The 
Deglaus also properly state that many Pennsylvania courts 
had honored the dictates of Rule 209 despite the suggestion 
of Rule 2959(e) that the judge may decide the case on his 
own initiative. See, e.g., Shainline v. Alberti Builders, 403 
A.2d 577, 581 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) ("Until one of the 
parties took action under Rule 209, or until some other 
force spurred matters along, the court should not have 
acted."); Corson v. Corson's, Inc., 434 A.2d 1269, 1271 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1981) (noting that a decision is "ripe for 
argument and decision upon the pleadings alone" only if a 
party files a request with the court to have the case heard 
on that basis in accord with Rule 209). On the other hand, 
at least one Pennsylvania court has noticed the tension 
between Rules 2959 and 209, and after an insightful 
analysis decided that Rule 2959 trumps the more general 
Rule 209. See Miller v. Wasilewski, 46 Pa. D & C.3d 46 (Ct. 
C.P., Clinton County 1986) (explaining that according to 
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 132, "particular rules 
control if in conflict with general rules," and noting that 
Rule 2959 particularly governs motions to open or strike 
confessed judgments, while Rule 209 generally governs 
motion practice). 
 
Discussing the impact of Rule 209 in the case before us 
is somewhat academic, as Rule 206.7, which is like Rule 
2959, is now the applicable rule of state civil procedure. 
The Supreme Court explained in Landgraf v. USI Film 
Products that although retroactive application of statutes is 
generally frowned upon, in many situations, "a court 
should `apply the law in effect at the time it renders its 
decision.' " 511 U.S. 244, 272 (1994) (citing Bradley v. 
School Bd. of City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974)). 
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This approach is particularly apt where a procedural rule is 
changed after a suit arises "[b]ecause rules of procedure 
regulate secondary rather than primary conduct . . .." 
Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 275. The decision whether to apply a 
new procedural rule "ordinarily depends on the posture of 
the particular case." Id. at 275 n.29. 
 
The district court first denied the Deglaus' Rule 60(b) 
motion in 1994. In 1996, Rule 206.7 replaced Rule 209, in 
effect bringing Pennsylvania's general procedural rule into 
conformance with its specific rules on confessed judgments, 
to make clear that a judge may decide a petition without 
the parties' request. On February 19, 1997, we vacated the 
district court's 1994 judgment denying the Deglaus' Rule 
60(b) motion. On September 30, 1997, the trial court 
ordered the Deglaus to file a brief in support of their 
motion, which they had failed to do when they initially 
moved to open the judgment in 1990. 
 
The judge reconsidered the case in light of the Deglaus' 
brief and the parties' actions on remand, which took place 
in 1997 and 1998. He denied the Deglaus' motion to open 
or strike in 1998, at that time applying Rule 206.7, which 
had been in effect throughout the entire remand period. 
During that period, the record reflects no efforts by the 
Deglaus to request a schedule for proceeding or to request 
oral argument, despite their continued contention that 
testimony was crucial. See R.488a. The district court's 
decision turned in part on the Deglaus' ongoing refusal to 
move the case forward, presumably by failing to schedule 
depositions or schedule oral argument. In short, the trial 
judge was applying Rule 206.7 to the events that took place 
after the 1997 remand. The posture of the case indicates 
that the district judge appropriately applied a new 
procedural rule to govern the secondary -- litigation- 
oriented -- conduct of the parties. Landgraf  expressly 
condones this approach.7 Further, given the Deglaus' notice 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Notably, the legislature's explanatory comments on Rule 206.7 
indicate that the rulemakers intended Rule 206.7 to resolve just the type 
of procedural confusion that arose when the judgefirst decided the 
motion to open or strike. The Comment to Rule 206.7 states that Rule 
209 "has been a source of difficulty for both the bench and bar." Rule 
206.7 Explanatory Comment (1995). The new rule was intended to clarify 
the proper procedure, so that "[i]f the petitioner does not proceed as 
required," the petition shall be decided on petition and answer. Id. 
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that the district judge did not think himself obliged to hold 
oral argument, they were not prejudiced by the judge's 
application of a rule placing on them the burden to request 
oral argument and making clear that the judge was entitled 
to rule absent their request.8 
 
To recapitulate, under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to which Girard directs us, the trial court was 
permitted to decide the motion on its own initiative, without 
informing the parties that a decision was forthcoming or 
holding oral argument. Under the Pennsylvania Rules of 
Civil Procedure in effect in 1998, it was permitted to do the 
same. Thus, although Girard is still good law, we cannot 
say that the trial court abused its discretion by applying 
aspects of both the federal and state rules of civil procedure 
in order to decide the motion on its own initiative. The 
outcome under both regimes is the same. 
 
III) Substantive Issues 
 
The district court stated that it was denying the motion 
to open because the Deglaus "made no effort to present 
evidence of meritorious defenses to this Court" and it noted 
that they initially failed to file a brief with their Rule 60 
motion, as required by Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7. 
R.503a (Mem. at 9). It then discussed several of the 
Deglaus' claims, and explained why they did not amount to 
meritorious defenses. The district court explained that it 
was denying the motion to strike the judgment because the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Along the same lines, the Deglaus argue that Rule 2959(e), by stating 
that a judge may decide the motion on "petition, answer and any 
testimony" requires that the trial court hold a hearing. Only one 
Pennsylvania trial court has agreed with this interpretation, and the 
language of Rule 206.7 specifically states that the petitioner and 
respondent may take depositions "or such other discovery as the court 
allows" and that if the petitioner does not pursue discovery, the trial 
court may decide the issue on the petition and answer. This rule does 
not require the trial court to hear testimony or hold oral argument, 
though it certainly seems to permit it to do either or both. Here, the 
Deglaus did not specifically request such an opportunity despite the fact 
that they knew from their first effort that the trial court was not 
inclined 
to arrange such an exercise on its own initiative. We are not persuaded 
that the court was required -- under either the federal or state rules -- 
to do so. 
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Deglaus had not identified any fatal defects or irregularities 
on the face of the record, as required. See id . 
 
A) Denial for Lack of Effort 
 
The proper inquiry for relief under Rule 60(b) is"whether 
vacating the . . . judgment will visit prejudice on the 
plaintiff [and] whether the defendant has a meritorious 
defense." Forest Grove, 33 F.3d at 288. The trial court here 
stated that the Deglaus made "no effort to present evidence 
of meritorious defenses to this court." R. 503a (Mem. at 9). 
That is simply untrue. The Deglaus filed with their Rule 
60(b) motion bank documents and letters exchanged 
between their attorney and Horizon's which supported 
several of their alleged defenses. See R.42a-116a. They 
initially failed to file a supporting brief with their motion, as 
required by Local Rule of Civil Procedure 20. On remand, 
the trial court stated that it was initially put off by the 
Deglaus' failure to pursue their motion, but now felt that 
further examination of their claims was warranted. See 
R.212a (Mem. of Sept. 30, 1997). He then entered an order 
requiring the Deglaus to file a brief in support of their 
motion. See Order of Sept. 30, 1997. Along with that brief, 
the Deglaus filed hundreds of additional pages of bank 
documents, corporate documents, and attorneys' letters in 
support of their defenses. The paper record in existence 
when the trial court decided the Rule 60(b) motion for the 
second time was replete with documents supporting the 
Deglaus' alleged defenses, although their admissibility was 
subject to debate and is discussed below. At any rate, the 
district court erred in stating that the Deglaus had made 
"no effort" to present meritorious defenses. 
 
We are similarly skeptical about the district court's 
statement that it was denying the motion because the 
Deglaus initially failed to file a brief in support of their 
motion. While this may have been a proper ground for the 
first denial in 1994, it was not appropriate the second time 
around because the judge had specifically ordered the 
Deglaus to file a brief and they had complied. Moreover, in 
ordering the brief, the judge stated that "the ends of justice" 
required further examination of the case. If so, it hardly 
seems appropriate to examine the case further based on the 
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required brief and then reject the motion out of hand based 
on an earlier and now-corrected failure to file. 
 
We are reluctant, however, to characterize either of these 
decisions as an abuse of discretion (requiring remand for a 
third round of back-and-forth in this case) if we accept the 
trial court's implication that the Deglaus in fact have no 
meritorious defenses. See R.503a-508a (Mem. at 9-14). In 
reviewing a decision for abuse of discretion, we may affirm 
the trial court on any basis supported by the record. See 
Tunstall v. Office of Judicial Support, 820 F.2d 631, 633 (3d 
Cir. 1987). Therefore, we review the record to see whether 
it supports any of the Deglaus' substantive claims. If it does 
not, we will affirm the trial court's decision. 
 
B) Analysis of Merits 
 
In reviewing the trial court's substantive analysis, we 
address again whether state or federal law governs. In 
Central W. Rental Co. v. Horizon Leasing, 967 F.2d 832, 837 
(3d Cir. 1992), we stated that we would look to federal 
common law for guidance in deciding Rule 60(b) motions. 
However, two recent Supreme Court cases have superseded 
this holding. In O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 
85-86 (1994), the FDIC sued a law firm for professional 
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. The FDIC argued 
that even though the cause of action arose under California 
law, federal law should govern the rights of the FDIC 
because it was appointed receiver of the failedfinancial 
institution at issue under a federal statute, FIRREA. See id. 
at 85-88. The Supreme Court roundly rejected this 
reasoning, stating that where Congress has promulgated a 
comprehensive and detailed statute, the court must 
presume that state law rather than federal common law 
governs matters unaddressed in the federal statute. See id. 
 
The Court expounded upon this holding in Atherton v. 
FDIC, 519 U.S. 213 (1997). In Atherton, the Court stated 
that federal courts facing a contested issue covered by 
federal statutory silence and a detailed state rule of 
decision would be justified in creating special federal rules 
of decision only where there is a " `significant conflict 
between some federal policy or interest and the use of state 
law.' " Id. at 218 (quoting Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum 
Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)). 
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We intimated in Forest Grove that O'Melveny probably 
required federal courts to apply Pennsylvania law to the 
substantive aspects of motions to open or strike confessed 
judgments. See Forest Grove, 33 F.3d at 290-91. But we 
stopped short of expressly overruling Central W. Rental Co. 
In Forest Grove, we explained that Central W. Rental Co. 
was still good law at the time the district court acted and 
therefore the district court's application of federal common 
law was not a material error. See Forest Grove , 33 F.3d at 
291. Second, we observed in Forest Grove that given the 
facts of the case, both Pennsylvania law and federal 
common law would lead to the same result. See id. We have 
no reservations today about stating conclusively that 
Pennsylvania law governs the substantive aspects of 
motions to open or strike confessed judgments. Unlike the 
district court in Forest Grove, which followed Central W. 
Rental Co. in good faith, the district court in the present 
case understood that O'Melveny cast doubt on Central W. 
Rental Co.'s invocation of federal common law. 9 Further, in 
the years since Forest Grove, Atherton  underscored the 
Supreme Court's antipathy to the inappropriate creation of 
federal common law. Taken together, Atherton and 
O'Melveny leave no doubt that Pennsylvania law should 
govern the substantive aspect of Rule 60(b) motions to open 
or strike judgment. 
 
Under Pennsylvania law, 
 
       A petition to strike and a petition to open are two forms 
       of relief with separate remedies; each is intended to 
       relieve a different type of defect in the confession of 
       judgment proceedings. A petition to strike off the 
       judgment reaches defects apparent on the face of the 
       record, while a petition to open the judgment offers to 
       show that the defendant can prove a defense to all or 
       part of the plaintiff 's claim. Manor Building Corp., 645 
       A.2d at 845 (citations omitted). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The trial court in the present case stated that we so held in Forest 
Grove. See R.499a (Mem. at 5). We certainly suggested that result in 
Forest Grove, but stopped short of so holding. Given, however, the 
district court's reference to O'Melveny and our express holding today 
that state substantive law applies, this characterization is, of course, 
harmless. 
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1. Motion to Strike 
 
A motion to strike a judgment will be granted only if a 
fatal defect or irregularity appears on the face of the 
judgment, and the defect must be alleged in the motion to 
strike. See Manor Building Corp., 645 A.2d at 846. In 
determining whether there is a defect, the court must 
review together the confession of judgment clause 
complained of and the complaint itself. See id.  at 252. The 
facts averred in the complaint are to be taken as true; if the 
debtor disputes their truth, the remedy is a motion to open 
the judgment. See id. Circumstances in which a judgment 
should be stricken include a creditor's lack of authority to 
confess judgment, see, e.g., Germantown Sav. Bank v. 
Talacki, 657 A.2d 1285, 1291-92 (Pa. 1995); entry of 
judgment by means not in accord with provisions of a 
warrant of attorney, see, e.g., Scott Factors, Inc. v. Hartley, 
228 A.2d 887, 888-89 (Pa. 1967); and warrants that are not 
in writing, or not signed directly by the person to be bound 
by them, see, e.g., Shidemantle v. Dyer, 218 A.2d 810, 811 
(Pa. 1966). 
 
The district court here articulated the proper standard for 
deciding a motion to strike, and stated baldly that"the 
Deglaus have not identified any `fatal defects or 
irregularities' on the face of the record." R.503a (Mem. at 9). 
It did not discuss what the Deglaus alleged the defect to be, 
or what portion of the record defeated their allegation. We 
review the district judge's Rule 60(b) analysis for abuse of 
discretion. See Girard, 557 F.2d at 390. A review of the 
Deglaus' original complaint reveals several general 
objections to the confessed judgment, but no specific 
allegations of fatal irregularities on the face of the 
judgment. In their supplemental brief filed after remand, 
the Deglaus specifically lay out seven problems with the 
confessed judgment: 
 
       - That Louis and Margaret Deg lau did not knowingly 
       and voluntarily assent to the warrant of attorney 
       provision in the Guaranty, thus making the confession 
       of judgment unconstitutional; 
 
       - That an agreement between H orizon, Kelt and G, K & 
       G, which released Kelt from the notes, discharged the 
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       Deglaus from liability under the Guaranty; That 
       Horizon and the Deglaus intended the Guaranty to 
       apply only to the loan made contemporaneous with the 
       Guaranty and no other loans; 
 
       - That the Guaranty, with res pect to the spreader 
       clause, was procured through fraud in the factum and 
       is, thus, void; 
 
       - That the FDIC failed to acc ount for [Kelt's payments 
       on the loan] in [its] confession of judgment; 
 
       - That as a result of the conflict of interest between 
       Horizon's attorneys and the Deglaus, in the sale of Kelt 
       to G, K & G, the Deglaus were not properly advised on 
       their options to pay off the Kelt debt; 
 
       - That Horizon violated the E qual Credit Opportunity 
       Act, with regards to Margaret when it required her 
       signature on the Guaranty even though Kelt, 
       individually, was creditworthy. 
 
       R.260a (Appellants' Brief to District Court after remand 
       at 18). 
 
All of these arguments are extrinsic to the judgment 
itself, and do not appear on the face of the judgment or 
record. Therefore, under Manor, 435 Pa. Super at 251 n.2, 
they are not appropriate bases for striking the judgment. 
The Deglaus did not, as required, allege in their motion 
grounds for striking the judgment. Further, once the 
Deglaus did specify their complaints about the judgment, 
none of these identified a fatal irregularity apparent on the 
face of the judgment. The Deglaus simply failed to meet 
their burden on this score, and the district judge certainly 
did not abuse his discretion in reaching this conclusion. 
The denial of the Deglaus' motion to strike the judgment is 
therefore affirmed. 
 
2. Motion to Open 
 
A motion to open is to be granted "[i]f evidence is 
produced which in a jury trial would require the issues to 
be submitted to the jury . . . ." Pa. R. C.P. 2959(e). Thus, 
the standard of sufficiency is that of a directed verdict. See 
Suburban Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Leo, 502 A.2d 230, 
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232 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). The district court is to view all 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner 
and to accept as true all evidence and proper inferences 
from it which support the defense while rejecting adverse 
allegations of the party obtaining the judgment. See id. The 
Pennsylvania rules regarding challenges to confessed 
judgment require the petitioner to offer "clear, direct, 
precise and `believable' evidence" of his meritorious 
defenses. Id. at 328. We review each of the Deglaus' seven 
defenses individually, though the trial court reviewed just 
three. 
 
a. Due Process 
 
The Deglaus argue that they did not knowingly waive 
their due process rights to notice and a hearing. Thus, they 
contend, the waiver was invalid, and the confession of 
judgment violated their constitutional rights. They offer as 
proof of involuntariness the Guaranty in which appears the 
confession of judgment clause authorizing the judgment at 
issue.10 The offending clause is, they assert, inconspicuous. 
Therefore, they cannot be said to have knowingly assented 
to its provisions when they signed the Guaranty. This 
argument is not persuasive. 
 
We have stated that "a judgment against a reasonably 
sophisticated, corporate debtor who has signed an 
instrument containing a document permitting judgment by 
confession as part of a commercial transaction is 
enforceable in the same manner as any other judgment." 
Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 
1272 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 
(1972)). Louis Deglau takes issue with the trial court's 
adoption of the finding of another judge that he was a 
sophisticated businessman.11 But he does not argue that he 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Some of the promissory notes the Deglaus signed included confession 
of judgment clauses; the Deglaus do not seem to be challenging those, 
perhaps because they were conspicuously presented on different pages 
in different typefaces. See, e.g., R.303a-04a; R.312a-14a. 
 
11. The trial court in the Western District of Pennsylvania, which 
rejected the Deglaus' request for an injunction barring the FDIC from 
confessing judgment, found Louis to be a sophisticated businessman. 
See Deglau v. RTC, No. 90-881 (W.D. Pa. 1990). 
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was a neophyte, probably because he was not. For 
instance, Pennsylvania courts have identified as signs of 
sophistication an individual's formation of a corporation, 
application for access to large sums of money, experience in 
business and a business involving large financial 
transactions. See Denlinger v. Dendler, 415 Pa. Super. 164, 
173-74 (1992). When he signed the Guaranty, Mr. Deglau 
was seeking access to a credit line of at least $50,000 and 
had received $1.5 million from the institution in the past; 
he had formed Kelt; and he had a longstanding relationship 
with the bank. He was a sophisticated businessman, and 
under Jordan, we are inclined to treat this confessed 
judgment as "enforceable in the same manner as any other 
judgment." 20 F.3d at 1272. 
 
We look further only to scotch Louis Deglau's assertion 
that his waiver of the right to notice and an opportunity for 
hearing were not voluntary because the warrant of attorney 
provision in the Guaranty was inconspicuous. Louis derives 
this argument from dicta in Jordan warning against 
inclusion of a warrant of attorney provision in"a mass of 
fine type verbiage on each reverse sheet." See id. at 1275 
(quoting Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw, 97 A.2d 234, 236 (Pa. 
1953)). He relies, too, on Germantown Manufacturing Co. v. 
Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). In 
Germantown, the court again cautioned against 
unanticipated clauses appearing in the boilerplate of a 
printed form, if not understood by the signer. See id. These 
cases are far afield of Mr. Deglau's situation, and thus do 
not support his argument. 
 
The court in Jordan warned against inconspicuous 
waivers, but did not invalidate a warrant of attorney clause 
appearing on the third page of a four-page document, 
apparently in unremarkable type. See Jordan, 20 F.3d at 
1256. If the paragraph in Jordan's four-page document was 
not problematic, certainly the paragraph in Louis Deglau's 
two-page Guaranty cannot be problematic. In Germantown, 
the court specifically stated that waivers in boilerplate were 
typically found unconscionable "only in consumer cases 
and courts have exhibited some reluctance to apply it in 
cases dealing with merchant-to-merchant contracts." 491 
A.2d at 146. We therefore affirm the trial court's 
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determination that the Deglaus' due process rights were not 
infringed.12 
 
b. Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
 
The court below rejected the argument that Margaret was 
"discriminated against" contrary to the provisions of the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1691 et seq. The 
Deglaus did not raise this issue in their opening brief on 
appeal. They have therefore waived it, and we will not 
address it. See, e.g., Brenner v. Local 514, United 
Brotherhood of Carpenters, 927 F.2d 1283, 1298. (3d Cir. 
1991). 
 
c. Remaining Claims 
 
The Deglaus' remaining claims are that the FDIC failed to 
account for payments made on the debt; that a subsequent 
agreement partially released Kelt and therefore released the 
Deglaus as guarantors; that the spreader clause in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The Deglaus intimate that they were denied due process because the 
trial court did not schedule a hearing on their motion to open or strike 
the judgment. The Jordan court stated that"opportunity for a prompt 
post-seizure hearing" was a key guarantee of due process. 20 F.3d at 
1271 (quoting Jordan v. Berman, 758 F. Supp. 269, 279-80 (E.D. Pa. 
1991)). But the Deglaus had an opportunity for a hearing. Under both 
Rule 7 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania and Rule 206.7 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil 
Procedure, they were permitted to ask for oral argument. The first time 
the trial court decided the motion on its own initiative, the Pennsylvania 
Rules of Civil Procedure in effect suggested that the trial court needed 
to 
 
invite the Deglaus to schedule a hearing before he could take 
independent action. Though, as discussed above, the state procedural 
rules are of doubtful application to this case, the confusion on that 
issue 
 
and the Deglaus' apparent belief that they retained the right to oral 
argument until they rejected the judge's invitation might have amounted 
to deprivation of a hearing in the first round of this lawsuit. But in the 
second round, the Deglaus were fully aware that this judge was inclined 
to take the bull by the horns and they still did not take advantage of 
their right to schedule a hearing. Moreover, by the time the trial court 
took the case on remand, the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure had 
been amended to disabuse the Deglaus of their mistaken belief that they 
could tarry with impunity. In light of these circumstances, we cannot say 
the Deglaus were denied an opportunity for a hearing, which is all that 
Jordan requires. 
 
                                22 
 
 
Guaranty was intended by the parties to apply to just the 
$200,000 loan and to no other; that the bank committed 
fraud in the factum in inducing the Deglaus to sign the 
disputed Guaranty; and that the Guaranty was not valid 
because it was the product of a conflict of interest. In 
support of these claims, the Deglaus have submitted 
numerous documents generated by themselves and by 
Horizon. The district court refused to consider these 
documents, stating that they were "side agreements" with 
the bank barred by the D'Oench Duhme doctrine. See 
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942). We 
first address the current status of the D'Oench Duhme 
doctrine, and then move on to the merits of the individual 
claims in light of our D'Oench Duhme analysis. 
 
Under the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court in 
D'Oench Duhme, side agreements not documented in the 
official records of a failed institution taken over by the FDIC 
are legally inadmissible to diminish or defeat the interests 
of the FDIC. See id. at 461. In 1950, Congress adopted the 
D'Oench Duhme doctrine in amendments to the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Act. In 1989, it codified a more detailed 
and precise version of the D'Oench Duhme doctrine as part 
of FIRREA to test whether agreements are enforceable 
against the FDIC. See 12 U.S.C. S 1823(e). Section 1823(e) 
generally requires that in order for an agreement to be 
enforceable against the FDIC, it must: (1) be in writing; (2) 
be executed by the depository institution and the person 
claiming an adverse interest under it contemporaneously 
with the acquisition of the asset by the depository 
institution; (3) be approved by the board of directors of the 
depository institution; and (4) have been an official record 
of the depository institution since its execution."The policy 
rationale behind the doctrine and section 1823(e) is that 
regulators addressing a financial institution's safety and 
soundness will not be aware of a bank's oral undertakings." 
See Central W. Rental Co., 967 F.2d at 841. 
 
Atherton, 519 U.S. 213 (1997), and O'Melveny, 512 U.S. 
79 (1994), again rear their heads to cast doubt on the 
current standing of the federal common-law D'Oench 
Duhme doctrine. Recall that in those cases, the Supreme 
Court mounted a campaign against the judicial creation of 
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federal common law. In recent years, several circuit courts 
have concluded that D'Oench Duhme is no longer viable as 
federal common law in the wake of these cases. The D.C. 
Circuit has flatly held that the Supreme Court's reasoning 
in O'Melveny "appears to leave no room for a federal 
common law D'Oench doctrine" because FIRREA's statutory 
provisions superseded it. Murphy v. FDIC, 61 F.3d 34, 39 
(D.C. Cir. 1995). The Eighth Circuit has stated that 
"O'Melveny removes the federal common law D'Oench 
Duhme doctrine . . . ." DiVall Insured Income Fund Ltd. 
Partnership v. Boatmen's First Nat'l Bank, 69 F.3d 1398, 
1402 (1996). The Ninth Circuit has held that, while 
D'Oench has not been overruled by Atherton  and O'Melveny, 
it was not applicable in a case where the FDIC was simply 
acting as a receiver of a failed institution, because no 
compelling federal interest was at stake. See Ledo Fin. Corp. 
v. Summers, 122 F.3d 825, 828-29 (9th Cir. 1997). The 
Eleventh Circuit held that O'Melveny was meant to halt the 
creation of new federal rules of decision, but did not 
abrogate application of existing federal common law, such 
as the D'Oench doctrine. See Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. 
v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 83 F.3d 1317, 1330 (11th Cir. 
1996). But the Supreme Court vacated Motorcity  and 
remanded it "for further consideration in light of Atherton v. 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation." Hess v. FDIC, 519 
U.S. 1087 (1997). We agree with the Eighth, Ninth and D.C. 
Circuits that D'Oench is not applicable federal common law 
in light of O'Melveny and Atherton. The Supreme Court 
explained that where it found "federal statutory regulation 
that is comprehensive and detailed," it would not 
supplement that scheme with federal common law. 
O'Melveny, 512 U.S. at 85. Section 1823(e) is 
comprehensive and detailed, and under O'Melveny  and 
Atherton we do not think D'Oench is needed to supplement 
it. 
 
The district court rejected the Deglaus' proffered evidence 
of fraud and conflict of interest, stating that it was 
inadmissible under D'Oench. See R.504a (Mem. at 10). It 
did not specifically discuss the claims of release, of 
miscalculation or of the parties' intentions about the 
spreader clause. We may presume that because those 
claims were supported with many of the same unexecuted 
 
                                24 
 
 
documents and correspondence supporting the fraud and 
conflict claims, the court found the evidence inadmissible 
under D'Oench and the claims so unmeritorious that 
discussion was unnecessary. The trial court erred in 
applying D'Oench to these claims. But in explaining the test 
for admissibility against the FDIC, the trial court also 
quoted section 1823(e). See id. Thus, although we find 
D'Oench outmoded, we may affirm the trial court's analysis 
under section 1823(e) if it did not constitute an abuse of 
discretion. 
 
i. Fraud in the Factum 
 
The Deglaus' first claim is that Horizon committed fraud 
in the factum because officials told them that the Guaranty 
they were signing would secure only the loan presently 
advanced, rather than all of Louis's then-outstanding loans 
(including the $1.5 advanced to Kelt in 1985), and any 
future loan. Appellant's Br. at 28. The trial court stated 
that the fraud defense was based on a side agreement not 
documented in any official bank record, and therefore the 
agreement was not enforceable against the FDIC under 
section 1823(e). R. 504a-05a (Mem. at 10-11). Presumably, 
the district judge concluded that the dearth of admissible 
evidence meant this claim would not withstand a motion for 
directed verdict. The Deglaus contend that section 1823(e) 
does not apply to the real defense of fraud in the factum. 
Appellant's Br. at 28. In a sense, the Deglaus are right. The 
Supreme Court has held that an instrument resulting from 
fraud in the factum is not governed by section 1823(e). See 
Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 93-94 (1987). But in another 
sense, the Deglaus are wrong. Fraud in the factum is 
defined as "fraud that procures a party's signature to an 
instrument without knowledge of its true nature or 
contents." Id. at 93. There was no such fraud here. 
 
The Deglaus have produced internal bank memoranda 
from 1987-88 and a series of letters exchanged in 1988 and 
1989 between their attorney and Meyer (the Board member 
and attorney who allegedly induced the Deglaus to sign the 
Guaranty without counsel). None of these documents 
suggest that in 1985 Louis Deglau did not know the nature 
of the Guaranty he was signing. At most, they suggest that 
Mr. Deglau interpreted the Guaranty to apply to the instant 
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loan, while Horizon interpreted it to apply to other loans as 
well. Compare R.422a (letter from Louis' lawyer stating "All 
concerned have recognized that Lou has disputed the 
responsibility for the [larger] figure from the beginning"); 
with R.424a (letter from Meyer stating that"in light of the 
documentation, it would appear that there is no question of 
the personal liability [for the larger amount]"). Notably, 
Meyer's letter states that Horizon officers "do not have first 
hand knowledge of the facts concerning the development of 
the relationship between Lou Deglau and Horizon." R.424a. 
Interpreted in Mr. Deglau's favor, this evidence suggests at 
most an oral, undocumented agreement between himself 
and someone affiliated with Horizon that the Guaranty 
would be limited to $200,000 despite the words of the 
document. Such an agreement does not constitute fraud in 
the factum. Further, it is the paradigmatic "secret" 
arrangement barred by section 1823(e). If, as Meyer's letter 
suggests, the Horizon board was unaware of the 
circumstances surrounding the Guaranty, regulators could 
not glean such a fact by reviewing bank records. Finally, 
Mr. Deglau has documented only a dispute about the 
amount secured by the Guaranty; he has not documented 
an agreement resolving that dispute in his favor. Even if 
there were such an agreement, it is not in writing, it had 
not been approved by the Horizon board and it had not 
been in the bank's official records. Therefore it cannot be 
considered under section 1823(e). The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in finding that the Deglaus had failed 
to produce evidence of fraud in the factum sufficient to 
withstand a motion for directed verdict. 
 
ii. Conflict of Interest 
 
The Deglaus next contend that the trial court erred in 
finding that their conflict of interest claim could not be 
proven because of the section 1823(e) bar. They claim that 
when Louis Deglau sold the troubled Kelt, Meyer 
encouraged Louis to conceal the transaction from his own 
attorney. Instead of Louis' having separate representation, 
Meyer purported to represent both Louis and Horizon in the 
sale. See Appellant's Br. at 29. But the Deglaus argue that 
because Meyer's loyalties were conflicted, he did not advise 
them of all of their options regarding repayment of the Kelt 
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debt. See id. They state that such a conflict of interest, or 
misrepresentation, is not governed by 1823(e) because it is 
not the sort of arrangement typically documented in bank 
records. Therefore, the absence of mention in bank records 
is irrelevant, they contend. This view would be entirely 
defensible in appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., Desmond 
v. FDIC, 798 F. Supp. 829, 836 (D. Mass. 1992) (lawyer's 
conflict of interest is an external fact that is peripheral to 
agreement and not necessarily governed by section 1823(e)). 
 
However, even if we reject the district court's approach 
and consider the evidence the Deglaus offer, we do not find 
enough to withstand a motion for directed verdict. In 
defense of this claim, the Deglaus refer us to their own 
complaint filed in the Western District of Pennsylvania 
seeking an injunction against the FDIC's confession of 
judgment. The allegations of that complaint are, of course, 
merely allegations and not evidence. Moving on, the 
Deglaus point us to minutes of a Horizon board meeting 
that show Meyer was a Horizon board member. See 
Appellant's Br. at 29 (citing R.298a). Finally, they cite 
Meyer & Flaherty's bill for services rendered to both Mr. 
Deglau and Horizon during the sale of Kelt. See id. (citing 
R.405-06a). These documents do not adequately 
demonstrate the type of conflict that would justify opening 
the judgment. In Desmond, the client whose attorney had a 
conflict of interest was not aware of the lawyer's divided 
loyalties. See id., 798 F. Supp. at 831. And in Slater v. 
Rimar, Inc., another case offered by the Deglaus, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that attorneys are not 
permitted to represent conflicting interests except by 
express consent of all concerned. 338 A.2d 584 (Pa. 1975). 
In this case, Louis was aware that Meyer sat on Horizon's 
board and represented Horizon's interests as well as his 
own. And despite Louis' longstanding representation by 
another law firm, he elected to conceal the Kelt sale from 
that firm and relied on Meyer's advice. In short, Louis' 
proffered evidence shows that, with full knowledge that 
Meyer's loyalties were divided, Louis elected to rely on him. 
This evidence therefore shows a conflict that, if it existed, 
was given full consent by Louis and there is nothing that 
warrants opening the judgment. The district court did not 
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abuse its discretion in declining to open the judgment on 
this ground. 
 
iii. Intentions of the Parties Regarding the Spreader 
       Clause in the Guaranty 
 
The November 1985 Guaranty includes a spreader 
clause, which states: 
 
       [T]he Undersigned hereby unconditionally guarantees 
       to Lender the prompt payment to Lender at maturity or 
       on acceleration of every note, check, bill of exchange, 
       draft, trade acceptance, loan, advance, discount and 
       order for the payment of money, and all other 
       obligations, in connection with which, either as maker, 
       drawer, guarantor, endorser or otherwise, whether 
       directly or contingently, Borrower is or shall hereafter 
       become liable to Lender whether created directly or 
       acquired by Lender by assignment or otherwise, 
       whether matured or unmatured and whether absolute 
       or contingent, with interest thereon, together with all 
       attorney's fees, costs and expenses of collection 
       incurred by Lender in connection with any matter 
       covered by this Agreement . . . . 
 
R.309a (emphasis added). 
 
Louis contends that, when he and Margaret signed the 
Guaranty, both they and Horizon officials "understood" that 
the Guaranty covered only the loan given at the time of the 
Guaranty, despite the fact that the language of the clause 
makes Deglau liable for all existing obligations (at the time, 
Louis had a $1.15 million loan outstanding) and all future 
obligations.13 In support of this argument, Louis offers a 
Horizon "credit request summary" prepared in 1987, a 1988 
memo prepared by Meyer on Horizon letterhead stating that 
Deglau was personally liable on just the $200,000 loan; a 
summary of Deglau's commitments prepared by Horizon's 
Commercial Loan Department which states that the 
Guaranty applies to just one loan; a 1988 "Analysis of Kelt, 
Inc. Modification," which indicates that at one time a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Louis said he initially applied for a $50,000 loan, but signed a blank 
Guaranty. The loan amount eventually filled in was $200,000, and Louis 
agrees he is liable for that amount. Appellant's Br. at 25. 
 
                                28 
 
 
Horizon official took the position that the Deglaus had 
secured $460,000 borrowed after they signed the Guaranty, 
but did not secure a $1.15 million loan predating the 
Guaranty; and a series of letters exchanged between the 
Deglaus' attorney and Meyer regarding the dispute over the 
secured amount. 
 
The district court did not discuss the merits of this claim. 
We must first decide whether under section 1823(e) we may 
consider any of the evidence Louis offers and, if so, whether 
that evidence is sufficient to withstand a motion for 
directed verdict. In order for a document to be admissible 
against the FDIC under section 1823(e), it must: (1) be in 
writing; (2) be executed by the depository institution and 
the person claiming an adverse interest thereunder, 
contemporaneously with the acquisition of the asset by the 
depository institution; (3) be approved by the board of 
directors of the depository institution and reflected in the 
minutes of the board's meetings; and (4) have been an 
official record of the depository institution continuously 
since its execution. See Central W. Rental Co. , 967 F.2d at 
841. Each of the proffered documents is in writing. 
However, none was executed by both parties. The credit 
request summary was signed by just a bank officer; the 
Commercial Loan Department summary and proposed 
modification appear to have been prepared by the bank, but 
were signed by neither party; the series of letters exchanged 
between the attorneys were not executed by both parties. 
Thus, all of these documents fail the second requirement of 
section 1823(e), and all are inadmissible. Further, none was 
executed contemporaneously with Horizon's acquisition of 
the assets in question. And, while the documents strongly 
suggest an alleged Horizon view that Deglau had not 
personally guaranteed the $1.15 million loan, "such 
suggestive evidence does not amount to a valid written 
agreement itself." Castleglen, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 
984 F.2d 1571, 1579 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Beighley v. 
FDIC, 868 F.2d 776, 783 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 
The details of Castleglen are instructive. In that case, the 
purchaser of an apartment complex maintained that the 
financial institution which sold the property guaranteed 
that the buyer would need to contribute just $600,000 
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before the project broke even. See Castleglen , 984 F.2d at 
1574. In support of this contention, the buyer offered a 
loan committee approval memorandum referencing an 
amount of money needed before the project "reaches break- 
even;" an operating agreement providing that the buyer 
would deposit $600,000 into escrow to secure payment for 
a start-up period; and a memorandum to the Senior Loan 
Committee discussing the escrow account. See id.  at 1579 
n.4. The court determined that, while these documents 
suggested that the bank had held this view, they did not 
amount to a written agreement that could be admitted 
against the FDIC under section 1823(e). See id.  at 1579. 
The documents in the present case similarly suggest the 
bank's understanding, but do not amount to a written 
memorialization of it. Moreover, unlike the 
contemporaneous documents deemed "suggestive" of the 
bank's view in Castleglen, the documents offered by Deglau 
were prepared after the Guaranty was signed. The 
argument that they were integral to the Guaranty is, 
therefore, weak. In sum, the documents may not be 
considered, and therefore the Deglaus failed to present 
evidence of this defense sufficient to withstand a motion for 
directed verdict. We affirm the district court with respect to 
this issue. 
 
iv. Horizon's Release of Kelt 
 
In 1988, Kelt assigned its rights to certain reclamation 
sites to a company known as G, K & G. Deglau contends 
that Horizon, Kelt and G, K & G entered an agreement 
under which G, K & G was to pay amounts due to Kelt 
directly to Horizon. "If [G, K & G] performed, the effect of 
this provision was to release Kelt from the notes that were 
secured by the lease under the agreement." Appellant's Br. 
at 23. Louis Deglau contends that G, K & G made several 
payments to Horizon, effectively releasing Kelt from a 
portion of the debt on which the FDIC later confessed 
judgment. Id. In support of this contention, Deglau proffers 
the agreement executed by Kelt and G, K & G; a 
memorandum that appears to have been produced by Kelt 
for G, K & G; several documents memorializing the Kelt-G, 
K & G agreement; and one apparently excerpted page of an 
agreement between Horizon and G, K & G. According to the 
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agreements between Horizon, G, K & G and Kelt, Horizon 
agreed not to "pursue collection of the obligation or 
obligations due it from Kelt, Inc. . . . so long as G, K & G. 
. . . proceed[ed] to process the coal gob or reject piles, sell 
the products of such processing and pay all sums due Kelt, 
Inc." directly to Horizon. R.447a. The record shows monthly 
payments from G, K & G. to Horizon throughout 1989, 
totaling about $95,000. See R.454a-460a. 
 
None of these documents meets the requirements of 
section 1823(e) because none was executed by both Deglau 
and Horizon. Deglau insists, nevertheless, that they are 
admissible against the FDIC because they pertain to the 
release of an obligation, and thus do not deal with an asset 
of Horizon. FDIC v. McFarland, 33 F.3d 532 (5th Cir. 1994), 
explains that obligations released prior to FDIC takeover of 
an institution are not assets and therefore not subject to 
section 1823(e). See id. at 537-38. McFarland also states 
that "where the asset has been discharged by the payment 
and cancellation of the underlying debt" before FDIC 
takeover, documents that do not meet the strictures of 
section 1823(e) may be used to defend against a claim for 
payment of the discharged debt. Id. at 538. On the other 
hand, if it is possible for a court to find that an obligation 
was not discharged, the FDIC has an "asset" and the "no 
asset" exception to section 1823(e)'s ban on unofficial 
documents would not apply. See Adams v. Madison Realty 
& Dev. Inc., 937 F.2d 845, 857 n.5 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
Louis claims that Horizon released Kelt, and the FDIC 
flatly disputes this claim. The district court did not resolve 
the factual question whether Horizon released Kelt, though 
the documents in the record suggest Horizon may have 
done so. This factual uncertainty leaves us midway between 
authorities. If Horizon released Kelt, and no asset remains, 
McFarland permits consideration of the unofficial 
documents; if a court could find there was no release, 
Adams bars consideration of the unofficial documents. 
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Louis, there 
was a potential discharge here, in which case the 
documents could be admitted, and there would be enough 
evidence on this claim to withstand directed verdict. The 
district court's failure to examine a potentially winning 
 
                                31 
 
 argument was an abuse of discretion. We therefore vacate 
the trial court's denial of the Deglaus' Rule 60(b) motion to 
open the judgment and remand for review of the merits of 
the Deglaus' "release" argument. 
 
v. Calculation of Judgment Amount 
 
Finally, Louis Deglau argues that the FDIC improperly 
confessed judgment for the face value of the loans, despite 
the fact that official bank documents suggested the loans 
had been partially paid down. Part of the payment was 
reflected by the G, K & G installment payments discussed 
above. Other payments apparently resulted from Louis's 
agreement to forego the salary he was to receive as 
president of Kelt; he contends that the parties agreed that 
the forfeited salary was intended to be applied against the 
debt secured by the Guaranty. See Appellant's Br. at 27. 
Throughout 1989, G, K & G paid about $95,000; Mr. 
Deglau states that in 1986, Kelt paid $168,830.21 of 
principal to Horizon.14 Louis has presented no official bank 
documents in support of this argument but, as discussed 
above, discharge of debt falls into the "no asset" exception 
to section 1823(e). See, e.g., McFarland, 33 F.3d at 537-38. 
Therefore, evidence other than official bank records is 
admissible. Louis has presented letters from G, K & G to 
Horizon detailing monthly payments, as well as letters 
exchanged between his lawyer and Meyer in which the 
status of his forfeited salary is debated. Viewing this 
evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner and 
accepting all proper inferences from it, as we must, we 
conclude that Deglau has presented sufficient evidence of 
these discharges to withstand a motion for directed verdict. 
See Suburban Mechanical Contractors, 502 A.2d at 232. The 
district court did not discuss this defense at all in its 
memorandum, and despite the fact that sufficient evidence 
on this defense was provided to withstand a directed 
verdict, the trial court denied the Rule 60(b) motion to open 
the verdict. This was an abuse of discretion, and the denial 
is vacated. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. How much of this reflects foregone salary, and how much reflects 
satisfaction of the debt is unclear. 
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IV) Conclusion 
 
In sum, we find that the trial court -- under both federal 
and state procedural law -- was entitled to decide the 
Deglaus' Rule 60(b) motion on its own initiative. However, 
in light of the Deglaus' prompt filing of the motion and the 
subsequent, understandable confusion about the applicable 
procedural rules, the trial court abused its discretion by 
denying the motion on the basis of the Deglaus' passivity, 
rather than on the merits of their substantive arguments. 
Similarly, although the Deglaus did err by failing to file a 
brief with their Rule 60(b) motion in 1990, the trial court 
permitted them to correct that error when it took the case 
on remand. Denying the Deglaus' motion because of the 
initial technical failure was improvident, particularly given 
the serious due process functions served by the availability 
of a motion to open or strike a confessed judgment."A 
warrant of attorney authorizing judgment is perhaps the 
most powerful and drastic document known to civil law 
. . . . The signing of a warrant of attorney is equivalent to 
a warrior of old entering a combat by discarding his shield 
and breaking his sword. For that reason the law jealously 
insists on proof that this helplessness and impoverishment 
was voluntarily accepted and consciously assumed." Cutler 
Corp. v. Latshaw, 97 A.2d at 236. We hesitate, however, to 
call this ruling an abuse of discretion unless it caused the 
trial court to inadvertently overlook any meritorious 
defenses that would have warranted opening the judgment. 
Our review reveals two defenses on which the Deglaus have 
produced sufficient documentation to withstand a motion 
for directed verdict and therefore to warrant opening the 
judgment. Hence, we hold that the trial court's refusal to 
open the judgment on two grounds -- Horizon's possible 
partial release of Kelt and the partial repayment of the 
loans on which the FDIC confessed judgment -- was an 
abuse of discretion. We therefore REVERSE the trial court's 
denial of the Rule 60(b) motion on these two grounds and 
REMAND these two matters for further proceedings. We 
AFFIRM the trial court's decision in all other respects. 
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